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ABSTRACT 
Since the early 1970s, scientists have used preference tests (tests that require animals to choose 
between two or more different options or environments) as a means of answering questions about 
animal welfare. Preference tests have been used to establish animals' preferences for common 
housing options such as ambient temperature, illumination and preferred types of bedding and 
flooring; to improve the effectiveness of devices such as loading ramps and nest boxes; and to 
clarify how strongly animals avoid various aspects of confinement and methods of restraint. 
To use preference research to answer questions about animal welfare, three issues need to be 
addressed. First, we must ensure that experiments do adequately reflect the animals' preferences. 
The preferences of an animal are likely to vary with the animal's age and experience, the time of 
day, environmental conditions, and the animal's on-going behaviour; therefore, preference 
experiments must be comprehensive enough to identify the relevant sources of variation. 
Experiments must also avoid confounding preference with familiarity, and avoid spurious results 
arising from the use of particular testing procedures and response measures. Second, to draw 
inferences about animal welfare from preference research requires that we establish how strongly 
an animal prefers a chosen option, avoids an unpref erred one, or is motivated to perform a certain 
behaviour (nest-building, exploration) that is prevented in some environments. Various methods to 
assess preference and motivation strength have been proposed. Third, the environments preferred 
by an animal will often, but not always, promote its welfare in the sense of health and psychological 
well-being. However, preferences may not correspond to welfare if the choices fall outside the 
animals' sensory, cognitive and affective capacities, or if animals are required to choose between 
short- and long-term benefits.  
Future priorities for preference testing include more emphasis on identifying the factors underlying 
animals' preferences, greater integration of preference research with other indicators of animal 
well-being, more reliance on the natural history of the species as a source of hypotheses about 





According to legend, Saint Francis of Assisi once approached a fierce wolf that had been terrorizing the Italian, town 
of Gubbio, and offered the animal a choice: rather than continue in its wild ways, the wolf could choose to live within 
the town walls as a sedate and well-fed citizen. The wolf accepted the latter option and lived happily in the town for 
some time, but eventually the wolf's wild nature proved hard to reconcile with the choice it had made, and it fled from 
the town in misery and disgrace (Bruckberger, 1971). 
Preference tests are commonly used as a tool in the study of animal welfare. Fundamental to this research is the 
assumption that animals make choices that are in their own best interests, and that a knowledge of the preferences 
shown by animals will help us understand and improve their welfare. However, the story of Saint Francis and the wolf 
suggests that this assumption is not always so straightforward. This chapter reviews the use of preference testing in 
animal welfare research, and attempts to answer the question raised by the story of Saint Francis and the wolf: under 
what conditions do the choices made by an animal serve as a reliable guide to its welfare? 
Fig. 11.1. A four-choice housing system for preference tests with mice, as described by Blom et al. (1992). 
The apparatus includes four test cages (TC) radiating from a central cage (CC). Four detector units (D), using 
red light emitting diodes, record the movement of animals along the passageways leading to the test cages. 
Behaviour in the cages was also monitored by video recording. 
 
 
11.2. Early Use of Preference Testing 
The naturalistic study of animal behaviour is an important precursor to preference testing. The fact that birds perch on 
branches or wires, and that mice burrow in fields or walls, provides information about the environments that these 
animals prefer. If collected in a systematic and quantitative way – for example by identifying the sizes of branches 
that birds do and do not use for perching - such observations can be a starting point for designing animal 
environments and a source of hypotheses for more controlled preference experiments. 
Similarly, traditional laboratory studies of behaviour have provided significant insights into animals' preferences, 
although such work was often done as basic research on animal motivation. For example, S.A. Barnett and 
colleagues monitored the movements of rats and mice in a residential maze where food, water, nesting material, and 
other resources were available in different compartments. The apparatus was used to study how exploration, feeding 
and other behaviour is influenced by deprivation, genetic differences and different stages of the reproductive cycle 
(Barnett and McEwan, 1973; Barnett and Smart, 1975; Cowan, 1977). Such methods (Fig. 11.1) are now being 
applied more specifically to questions about animal welfare (Nicol, ·1986; Blom et al., 1992). 
Surprisingly, the formal proposal to study animals' environmental preferences as a component of animal welfare 
research arose from a British parliamentary committee. The ethologist W.H. Thorpe was one of the members of the 
'Brambell Committee' formed in the United Kingdom to investigate the welfare of intensively housed farm animals. In 
his appendix to the committee's report, Thorpe (1965) proposed what became an agenda for using scientific of stress, 
indicators of pain and discomfort, studies of motivation that might be thwarted in confined animals, and research into 
the cognitive powers of animals. He also mentioned the intriguing possibility of 'asking' animals about their 
environmental preferences. The example that Thorpe cited was a chance observation: 
In the early part of 1964 a group of African buffalo were captured in a region of Kenya where their 
natural existence was no longer tolerable or possible, and were taken for release in the Nairobi 
National Park ... During the process of transport and preparation for release, they were of course 
kept in pens or yards much like those in which domestic cattle are kept. When the time came for 
their release in the new environment, they showed many signs of distaste for it. They would return 
toward human habitations toward nightfall and try to enter the paddocks where they had been. One 
even tried to walk through the French windows of the office of the Director of the Kenya National 
Parks. The   natural assumption is that the unfamiliar National Park, reeking of lion, leopard and 
other dangerous and uncomfortable neighbours, must have seemed a very unfriendly place; far 
inferior to the luxurious though restricted quarters they had become used to inhabiting! (Thorpe, 
1965, pp. 73-74) 
Thorpe concluded that because these animals had experienced a range of living conditions, we could legitimately 
'ask' them which they preferred. 
Appropriately enough, the first actual experiment using preference testing to resolve a farm animal welfare issue 
arose from one of the more specific recommendations of the Brambell Committee. The committee had concluded that 
the flooring materials used for hens in cages were often unsatisfactory. The committee was particularly critical of 
'chicken wire' flooring (fine-gauge wire netting of a hexagonal pattern) which, it suggested, 'the bird's foot is not well 
adapted to grip' (Brambell, 1965, p. 21). Instead, the committee recommended that the cage floor should consist of a 
heavy-gauge rectangular metal mesh.  
To obtain the hens' own view of this recommendation, Hughes and Black (1973) tested the preferences· of hens for 
different types of flooring. They housed hens in cages consisting of two sections, each floored in a different material 
(Fig. 11.2). They offered various materials in pair-wise choices, and simply observed how much time the birds· spent 
on the different flooring products. The results indicated that the hens had no strong preferences or aversions for the 
different materials, but their overall preference was for, rather than against, the fine-gauge 'chicken wire' which the 
Brambell Committee had deemed unsuitable. 
Other early preference testing tried to answer broader questions. Dawkins (1977) used preference testing to· ask 
whether hens prefer battery cages to large pens or outdoor runs. In one experiment she gave hens free access to 
cages and to larger pens for 12 hours, and observed the time that the hens spent in each environment. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the hens spent considerable time in the cages. She then did a series of trials in a T-maze where turning 
in one direction caused hens to spend the next 5 minutes in a battery cage, while turning in the other direction led to 
5 minutes in an outdoor run. With this procedure, the hens tended to select the outdoor run. 
Since these early examples, environmental preference testing and related measures have been used for an 
impressive variety of purposes in animal welfare research. Simple uses include establishing preferences for ambient 
temperature (Morrison et al., 1987), for illumination levels (Baldwin and Start, 1985; van den Broek et al., 1995), and 
for common materials such as types of bedding (Hunter and Houpt, 1989; Blom et al., 1993) and flooring (Marx and 
Mertz, 1989). The methods have also been used to identify which design features of animal housing and handling 
equipment are significant to the animals themselves. Such knowledge has allowed more effective design of loading 
ramps (Phillips et al., 1989), nest boxes (Hurnik et al., 1973), roosts (Muiruri et al., 1990) and other equipment. The 
methods have also been used to assess how strongly animals seek to avoid noise and vibration (Stephens et al., 
1985) and various forms of restraint (Rushen, 1986a). 
Despite these successes, preference testing has remained a controversial tool in animal welfare research. In fact, the 
ink had barely dried on the earliest reports of preference testing when debate broke out over what we can actually 
conclude from the technique. Initially Duncan (1978a); and subsequently others (e.g. van Rooijen, 1982; Hutson, 
1984), provided many criticisms of preference testing, and these stimulated major changes in how preference tests 
are conducted and interpreted (reviewed by Dawkins, 1980, 1983b; Duncan, 1992a; Fraser et al., 1993; Fraser, 
1996). Three main issues are involved, two of them mainly methodological and one mainly conceptual, as we 
describe in sections 11.3 to 11.5 below. 
11.3. Ensuring that Experiments Adequately Reflect Animals' Preferences 
The first and most basic concern is that preference experiments must accurately capture and identify the animals' 
true preferences, and this requires attention to several points about how we design and conduct preference research. 
11.3.1. Asking suitably complex questions 
One criticism of the early preference research is that simple experiments of the type described above underestimate 
the complexity of animals' environmental preferences. On the surface it might seem reasonable to ask whether pigs 
prefer pens with straw bedding or pens with bare concrete floors. However, in an initial experiment designed to 
answer this question (Fraser, 1985), pigs gave very inconsistent results, and further research showed that the pig's 
degree of preference for straw depends on a variety of factors. Specifically, pigs appear strongly attracted to straw for 
foraging, but are relatively indifferent to the presence of straw when using a feed or water dispenser; they either 
prefer or avoid a straw-bedded surface for resting, depending on whether the environment is cool or warm; and 
preference for straw increases sharply just before parturition when sows normally make nests (see Steiger et al., 
1979; Fraser, 1985; Marx and Mertz, 1989; Fraser et al.; 1991; Arey, 1992). To deal with this complexity, we need not 
a simple experiment to determine whether pigs prefer straw, but a more comprehensive study of how the preference 
is influenced by features of the environment and by the animal's condition and behaviour. Even when the ultimate 
objective is to decide what kind of housing is best on average for a certain type of animal, research methods that 
ignore relevant variables are likely to give contradictory results. 
Asking more complex questions about animal preferences puts certain demands on experimenters. First, 
experiments must cover sufficient variation to monitor animals' preferences under a range of fluctuations in both the 
environment and the animal's condition. Brief tests in a T-maze, as used in the 1970s, have given way to methods 
such as continuous video or electronic monitoring over periods of days or weeks. For example, van den Broek et al. 
(1995) electronically monitored the movements of gerbils during 48-hour periods in an apparatus that provided 
different levels of illumination in different compartments; they found that the animals had a clear preference for low 
light intensities for sleeping but not at other times. Second, experiments should be designed so that individual 
differences and other variability in the animals' responses can be interpreted. Nicol (1986) noted that when given a 
range of cage sizes, hens invariably spend some time in the less favoured cages. She proposed that these 
differences might occur because preferences genuinely vary between individuals or over time, or simply because the 
birds tend to move about, monitoring the environment periodically, or for other reasons. These different possibilities 
can be tested with appropriate experimental designs.  
11.3.2. Avoiding spurious results 
In a given experiment, the particular apparatus or response measure used may have unexpected effects on the 
preferences ·that animals show. Fig. 11.3 illustrates a case where different procedures - both designed to test 
whether sows would prefer a narrow or wide enclosure for farrowing - resulted in contradictory results. Experiments 
described by Baxter (1991) used four solid, parallel partitions to create three open-ended stalls of different widths in 
the centre of a large room. Sows housed in this room for farrowing tended to use the narrowest stall more often than 
the wide ones, and Baxter (1991, p. 12) concluded ‘that sows have a significant preference for small farrowing sites.’ 
Phillips et al. (1992) used an apparatus consisting of three farrowing stalls radiating from a central hub area. Under 
these conditions, sows showed a very strong preference for the widest stall ahead of narrower alternatives. Why did 
the two experiments give contradictory results? The stalls, used by Baxter (1991) were enclosed by solid walls on two 
sides and were open at the ends; therefore, the narrow stalls provided more visual enclosure than the wider ones and 
may have been preferred for this reason (see Phillips et al., 1991). Alternatively, the fact that sows could walk straight 
through the stalls used by Baxter (1991), but had to back out of those used by Phillips et al. (1992), might have 
affected their choice of stall width. 
Fig. 11.3. A plan of experimental apparatus designed to test the size of enclosure that sows prefer for 
farrowing. At left, a large room with four solid, wooden partitions forming three open-ended stalls 550, 950 or 
1350 mm wide (from Baxter, 1991). Sows placed in the room could choose to farrow in any stall at will, or in 
other parts of the room. At right, three farrowing stalls, 450, 750 or 1200 mm wide, radiating from a central 
area where the sow could exit from one stall and enter another (from Phillips et al., 1992). 
 
 
A further concern arises when an animal is required to perform some 'instrumental' or 'operant' response (i.e. a task 
such as pressing a lever or pecking a key) in order to obtain a reward (see Lagadic, 1989). Certain instrumental 
responses are appropriate for certain types of reward but not for others (Hinde and Stevenson-Hinde, 1973). For 
example, it is natural for hens to find food by pecking and to enter a new area by walking. However, in an experiment 
by Lagadic and Faure (1987), hens were required to peck a key in order to activate a motorized barrier and thus 
enlarge their cage. In such an experiment, can we trust the result as a true reflection of the hen's motivation to have 
additional space? Or would alternative responses (e.g. walking rather than pecking) have given different results? The 
traditional instrumental responses used by experimental psychologists studying motivation for food and water (key-
pecking, lever-pressing) often bear little natural relation to the kind of rewards used in research on animal welfare; 
hence, such methods need to be carefully investigated and validated. 
These various examples illustrate the need for 'constructive replication', whereby the main features of an experiment 
are repeated using somewhat different methods, to ensure that the conclusions are not unduly influenced by a 
particular experimental apparatus or the manner in which a preference is expressed. 
11.3.3. Determining the effects of experience on preferences 
Experimental designs also need to take account of the animals' previous experiences (Hughes, 1976b; Petherick et 
al., 1990). In the simplest cases, animals may show a temporary avoidance of, or attraction to, unfamiliar options, but 
these temporary reactions must not be used to infer longer-term preferences. For example, Dawkins (1980) noted 
that hens housed in cages tended, in initial preference trials, to select a cage over an outdoor run, but a few minutes 
of exposure to the run was enough to overcome this initial reaction. In other cases, preferences may undergo longer-
term change as the animals gain experience of the different options. For example, Phillips et al. (1996) housed sows 
for three weeks in a preference apparatus where the animals could choose to be on different types of flooring. Initially 
the sows strongly preferred concrete flooring, with which they were familiar, to metal and plastic products. However, 
this preference waned after several weeks as the animals gained experience of the different alternatives. In this case, 
the animals may have needed prolonged exposure to the options to become confident in walking and going through 
their normal postural changes on the different surfaces. 
11.4. Assessing the Strength of Animals' Preferences 
A preference shown by an animal in a choice experiment may be a weak preference, like a preference for grapes 
over cherries, or a strong preference, like a preference to live in a house rather than a dungeon. Denying animals 
access to their preferred options presumably affects welfare more if the preference is strong rather than weak. Thus, 
in addition to establishing what an animal prefers, we also need some indication of preference strength. As expressed 
by Dawkins (19836, p. 23):  
Just because an animal prefers one thing to another or chooses one set of conditions over another, 
this cannot be taken to mean that it necessarily suffers if it has to make do with its least preferred 
state . . . What we need is a way of calibrating the various signs of welfare and suffering in a 
quantitative way. 
A related concern arises from the experimental designs used in most preference testing. As noted by Fraser et al. 
(1993, pp. 108-109): 
In most other types of research, the variation attributable to the treatment is compared with 
extraneous variation, due to individual animals or groups, to location effects, time effects, and so 
on. In preference tests the different options are usually presented to the same animals at the same 
time and in almost the same place. 
Consequently, preference tests generally minimize extraneous variation, and may detect statistically significant 
differences even where the magnitude of the preference is small. 
In the simplest approach to establishing preference strength, experimenters have tried to determine whether a 
preferred environment is sufficiently rewarding that an animal will learn to perform some operant or other instrumental 
response to obtain access to it. For example, having established that hens prefer floors with litter instead of bare wire, 
Dawkins and Beardsley (1986) tested whether hens would learn to peck a key or break a photobeam to gain access 
to a cage with litter. If the animal can be trained in such a way, then the motivation to be in that environment must be 
more than trivial. 
Such experiments, however, do not provide a quantitative scale for comparing the strength of different preferences. 
Consequently, Dawkins (1983a) proposed that we might assess the strength of one preference by 'titrating' it against 
a second, well understood preference for a reward such as food. In one experiment, Dawkins trained hens to enter 
two cages from a common choice point. One cage contained litter (to permit dust-bathing) but no food, while the other 
contained food but no litter. Dawkins then required the hens to choose between the two cages after zero, 3 or 12 
hours of food deprivation. The results suggested that the hens' motivation for dust-bathing, under the given 
conditions, was about as strong as their motivation to eat when food had been withheld for 3 hours.  
In a further refinement, Dawkins (1983a, 1990) proposed that motivation testing could be blended with a concept 
used by economists to assess the importance of a commodity to human consumers: 
Commodities for which a given percentage increase in price results in a decrease in the quantity 
demanded are said to have elastic demand and are sometimes called luxuries; those for which a 
given percentage increase in price results in little change in the quantity demanded are said to 
have inelastic demand and may be called necessities . . . Elasticity of demand is a key concept for 
the study of animal welfare . . . because it shows how important different environments or 
commodities are to the animals themselves. (Dawkins, 1990, p. 6) 
To apply this concept to animals, a commodity such as food can be provided in response to some work ('price') that 
the animal has to perform, and the 'price' can then be varied experimentally. Commodities that are very important to 
the animal should show relatively inelastic demand; that is, the animal should work harder and harder to maintain a 
given level of reward if the reward is very important. By establishing the elasticity of demand, we should be better 
able to judge the importance that animals attach to food, companionship, bedding, exercise and other features. 
Technical and other difficulties in using the method have been noted by Dawkins (1990), Dantzer (1990), Mench and 
Stricklin (1990) and others.  
In research to date, various methods have been used to vary the 'price' that animals must pay for commodities. 
Matthews and Ladewig (1994) used an operant response to vary price. In their experiment pigs were required to 
press a nose-plate to receive either food or social contact with another pig. As the number of presses needed to 
obtain food was increased from 1 to 30, the pigs compensated by pressing more and more, and thus obtained a fairly 
constant amount of food. When social contact was the reward, the pigs failed to compensate for the increasing price 
and received fewer rewards. An alternative approach is an obstruction test which requires animals to overcome some 
obstacle in order to gain access to a reward. Petherick and Rutter (1990) described a computer-controlled push-door 
that they used to measure the amount of 'work' that hens would expend to obtain food, and Duncan and Hughes 
(1988) used a similar method to measure hens' motivation to enter a nest box for laying. The dangers of obtaining 
spurious results because of artefacts are discussed by Petherick and Rutter (1990). In limited time tests, the 
experimenter increases the price of commodities by reducing the amount of time available to obtain them. For 
example, Dawkins (1983a) placed hens for several hours per day in an apparatus consisting of one cage furnished 
with food and water, and a second, adjoining cage containing only litter. She gave the birds 2, 4 or 8 hours in the 
apparatus, and they had no access to food or litter at other times. When the birds had 8 hours in the apparatus, they 
spent considerable time with the litter, but when time was limited to 2 hours, the birds reduced the time they spent 
with litter in order to feed. 
Finally, measures of motivation strength can also be applied to situations that animals avoid. For example, Rushen 
(1986a) used aversion testing to assess the welfare implications of electro-immobilization of sheep. Electro-
immobilization involves use of a pulsed, low-voltage current passed through the body to immobilize an animal. Some 
veterinarians had claimed that the technique reduces the distress that animals experience during restraint for 
procedures such as shearing. Rushen trained sheep to move along a runway to a pen where they were restrained in 
various ways with and without electro-immobilization. He showed that over repeated trials, sheep that received the 
electrical treatment at the end of the runway became more difficult to move along the runway than those that were 
restrained without electro-immobilization. The usefulness and validity of various behavioural measures of aversion 
are discussed by Rushen (1986b) and Rutter and Duncan (1991, 1992). 
11.5. Clarifying the Link between Preferences and Welfare 
Even when we have accurately identified an animal's preferences and assessed their strength, we need to clarify the 
conceptual issue of how an animal's preferences relate to its welfare. For this, we need to be reasonably clear on 
what we mean by welfare. 
For present purposes, we will consider two key components of animal welfare (see Chapter 2). The first is based on 
the subjective experiences of the animal and involves reasonable freedom from prolonged or intense pain, 
discomfort, frustration and other unpleasant states, together with positive experiences such as comfort and 
contentment. The second component is based on the biological functioning of the animal and involves freedom from 
disease, injury, and malnutrition, and other threats to normal health and survival. 
Presumably an animal's preferences are closely linked to its subjective experiences at the time of making the choice. 
For example, we assume that animals will in general seek out environments in which they find comfort, contentment 
and other positive experiences, and will avoid environments in which they suffer. As noted by Dawkins (1980, p. 91): 
'Animals may not be able to talk, but they can vote with their feet and express some of what they are feeling by where 
they choose to go.' 
However, the link between preferred environments and positive subjective experiences may break down if the short-
term and longer-term consequences of the choice are in conflict. As Duncan (1978a, p. 198) noted:  
Animals . . . cannot be expected to weigh up the long-term consequences of their decisions as 
would human beings, and make rational choices accordingly. In fact there is an increasing volume 
of evidence . . . to show that animals prefer an immediate reward compared to an equal or even 
larger reward sometime in the future. 
Duncan's example involved hens which are given 'trap-nests' in which to lay eggs. After entering a trap-nest, the bird 
cannot escape until it is released by a handler and thus may remain trapped without food, water and social contact for 
several hours after oviposition. The fact that hens continue to use the nests does not necessarily mean that they do 
not mind being held in the trap-nests, nor that their preference for laying in a nest box outweighs their aversion to 
being restrained. Rather, the hens' behaviour on entering the nest may simply reflect their motivation at the time, and 
not the future consequences of the action. 
The link between preferences and the biological functioning of the animal is perhaps more complex. For an animal of 
a wild genotype developing and living in an environment similar to that in which the species evolved, we expect 
natural selection and ontogenic development to produce a set of environmental preferences that promote the health 
and survival of the individual and its offspring. Exceptions may arise, however, if an artificial environment creates 
challenges for which the animal's evolution and ontogenic development have failed to prepare it, or if the animal has 
been genetically altered in relevant ways through selective breeding. 
The simplest problems arise if animals are exposed to potential dangers or benefits that are beyond their sensory and 
affective capacity. Many fish species successfully avoid being harmed by certain aquatic pollutants, such as copper, 
simply by swimming away from contaminated water (Giattina and Garton, 1983). However, fish generally fail to avoid 
certain other contaminants, such as phenol, selenium, even at levels that cause serious damage or death (Giattina 
and Garton, 1983; Hartwell et al., 1989). Presumably the fish never evolved or developed the capacity to detect these 
contaminants, and in these cases their preferences fail to protect their health. 
A similar limitation may occur if a choice requires a level or type of cognitive ability that the animal does not possess. 
Rats rapidly learn to avoid a poisoned food on the basis of its flavour, but not if colour or pellet size is its 
distinguishing feature (McFarland, 1985). In this case the rats presumably can detect all the distinguishing stimuli, but 
do not readily associate symptoms of poisoning with the visual properties of the food: 
As these examples show, an animal's preferences will not always promote its welfare in the long term. Perhaps the 
best safeguard is to base preference research on the types of choices that the species arguably evolved the capacity 
to make, and that the individual animals are accustomed to making in their normal lives. 
11.6. Future Directions for Preference Research 
For the future, we propose that preference and motivation research needs to develop in four directions. First, instead 
of simple, empirical comparisons of different environments or materials, preference research needs to identify the 
primary factors influencing the preferences that animals show. Two approaches have been used for this purpose 
(Fraser et al., 1993). In a multivariable approach, preferences or preference rankings are established among a large 
number of options which differ in numerous features, and statistical analysis is used to indicate which features are 
most closely related to the animals' preferences. For example, Farmer and Christison (1982) established the 
preferences of young pigs for a variety of flooring products,' and also measured many attributes of the products, 
including the amount of traction they offered, the degree of heat loss through the material, and the abrasiveness of 
the surface. Statistical analysis then showed that weaned pigs tended to choose high-traction floors, whereas very 
young piglets chose floors that would not conduct heat away from the body (Christison and Farmer, 1983). 
Alternatively, in a serial factor approach, a series of preference experiments is conducted, each one testing 
preferences for different levels of a single design feature. For example, Phillips et al. (1988) exposed pigs to ramps of 
different designs. In one experiment, the ramps differed only in slope; in another they differed only in level of 
illumination; in another they differed in width, and so on. The animals showed clear preferences when the slope and 
traction of the surface were varied, but they seemed indifferent to variation in other features. By using such methods 
to identify the primary factors mediating animals' preferences, we have a better chance of extrapolating appropriately 
beyond the particular range of options tested. 
A second challenge will be to integrate preference research with other measures used in animal welfare assessment. 
In theory, animals kept in environments that they strongly prefer ought to experience less discomfort and frustration, 
and this should lead to lower levels of stress, and perhaps greater health, longevity and reproduction. However, most 
preference research to date has been done somewhat in isolation from other types of animal welfare research, and 
the wider animal welfare impacts of providing animals with preferred environments have been too little studied.  
Third, a knowledge of the natural history of a species could be better used to provide guidance for preference 
research. The environments preferred by sows for farrowing are probably quite similar to the nest sites that sows 
seek in nature (Phillips et al., 1991). Likewise, features of cage design preferred by laboratory rodents, of perches 
preferred by birds, or of enrichment devices preferred by captive primates may well resemble the features of such 
items used by those species or their wild ancestors living in natural environments. Thus, a knowledge of natural 
history could help investigators identify potentially important variables in advance, and the power of controlled 
experimentation could then establish the relative importance to the animal of the variables that characterize the 
environments they use in nature. 
A fourth challenge will be to make better use of environmental preference testing in the design of new animal 
environments. Duncan (1992b) suggested that many 'alternative' systems of animal production, designed to meet 
animal welfare concerns in the 1970s and 1980s, were actually more inspired by public perceptions of animal welfare 
rather than the 'real needs' of the animals. Concerning systems for hens, he noted:  
During this era, two approaches dominated. One was the ' back to nature' approach which 
advocated keeping hens on free-range or semi-extensively in spite of the fact that the associated 
problems of predation, exposure to inclement weather, parasite infestation and general disease 
control were still within living memory. The other was the 'let's build them a palace' approach which 
tried to incorporate every conceivable requirement into the birds' environment. (Duncan, 1992b, p. 
476) 
In contrast to these approaches, a solid understanding of animals' environmental preferences and the strength of 
those preferences should allow us to design environments that cater to the priorities of the animals themselves. 
11.7. Coda 
So, when the wolf of Gubbio chose to live in the town rather than in the wild, could we have concluded that its choice 
provided objective information about its welfare, and that the wolf would live a happier life in the town? As a 
preference test, this situation was seriously flawed in two respects. First, the choice offered to the wolf failed to take 
account of the complexity of the animal's environmental preferences; the town might meet the wolf's needs at certain 
times but not others. Second, the choice, with its requirement to balance the immediate advantages of a free dinner 
against the long-term constraints of urban living, probably fell outside the animal's ability to weigh up present and 
future outcomes. These deficiencies may not have troubled Saint Francis, as he could allegedly converse with 
animals in their own languages. For those of us who lack this gift, the careful design of environmental preference 
tests will remain an important manner of understanding an animal's reactions to the environments in which they are 
kept. 
11.8. Conclusions 
Preference and motivation testing provide useful information on the reactions of animals to methods of handling and 
housing and to other features of their environment. 
The environmental features preferred by an animal are likely to vary with its age and experience, its reproductive 
state, its on-going behaviour and other variables. Preference research must be comprehensive enough to identify 
these sources of variation. 
To draw inferences about an animal's welfare from preference research, the strength of the animal's preferences 
needs to be known. Various methods to assess preference and motivation strength have been developed.  
Great care is needed over the methods of preference and motivation testing. Particular test procedures or response 
measures may have unexpected impacts on the preferences that animals show. Research must also avoid 
confounding preferences and familiarity. 
Animals' preferences, as revealed by preference tests, often identify environmental features that will promote their 
welfare. However, the link between preferences and welfare may break down if the choices offered in preference 
tests fall outside the animals' sensory, cognitive and affective capacities or if animals are required to choose between 
short-term and long-term benefits.  
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